

# Lecture 4: On Sense and Reference II

Philosophy of Logic and Language — HT 2017-18

Jonny McIntosh

[jonathon.mcintosh@balliol.ox.ac.uk](mailto:jonathon.mcintosh@balliol.ox.ac.uk)

## Works by Frege

The main texts this week are 'On Sense and Reference' and 'Thought', both in *The Frege Reader*:

*The Frege Reader*, ed. by Michael Beaney (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997).

'Thought' is the first of three late papers laying out Frege's philosophy of logic. The other two are 'Negation' and 'Compound Thoughts'. 'Negation' is in *The Frege Reader*, and all three can be found in *Logical Investigations*:

*Logical Investigations*, ed. by Peter Geach, trans. by Peter Geach and R. H. Stoothoff (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977).

## Secondary Reading

As always, starred items (\*) are introductory, and good places to start. Russell (1905) presents his theory of descriptions and contains the Gray's elegy argument, taken by some to be targetting Frege's sense-reference distinction. Salmon (1986) and Soames (2002) are two prominent examples of neo-Russellianism. Gray (2017) is an introduction to an interesting alternative approach, associated with Kit Fine. For discussion of Frege's extension of the sense-reference distinction to sentences and concept-expressions, see Burge (1986), Heck and May (2008), and Makin (2010). For a debate on the problems posed for Frege's theory by indexicals, see Perry (1977) and Evans (1981).

Tyler Burge (1986) 'Frege on Truth' reprinted with a Postscript in his *Truth, Thought, Reason: Essays on Frege* (Oxford: OUP).

Gareth Evans (1981) 'Understanding Demonstratives' in his (1985) *Collected Papers* (Oxford: OUP).

Aidan Gray (2017) 'Relational Approaches to Frege's Puzzle' in *Philosophy Compass* 12(10), pp. 1-15.

- Saul Kripke (1980) *Naming and Necessity* (Blackwell).
- \*Gideon Makin (2010) 'Freges Distinction Between Sense and Reference' in *Philosophy Compass* 5(2), pp. 147-163.
- John Perry (1977) 'Frege on Demonstratives' in *The Philosophical Review* 86(4), pp. 474-497.
- Bertrand Russell (1905) 'On Denoting' in *Mind* 14(56), pp. 479-93.
- Nathan Salmon (1986) *Freges Puzzle* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
- Scott Soames (2002) *Beyond Necessity* (Oxford: OUP)
- \*Mark Textor (2011) *Frege on Sense and Reference* (London: Routledge), Ch. 5 to 7.
- \*Joan Weiner (2004) *Frege Explained* (Chicago: Open Court), Ch. 6 and 9.