Early Modern Philosophy

Below are readings and essay questions for tutorials in Early Modern. Many of the readings are available online, and all are easily obtained from the college or other libraries in Oxford, but if you are struggling to get hold of anything, email me, as I have PDF copies of nearly everything.

The default plan is to cover three topics on DESCARTES (The Cogito, God, and Error and the Will), one on BERKELEY (Immaterialism), and two on HUME (Reason and Induction and Causation), and then two further topics of your choice on these authors. But this is not set in stone, and I have provided some suggestions for alternative topics. If you want to cover some of these or something else instead, let me know, and I’ll see what we can do. Note that topics you may have covered in doing General Philosophy in first year, and so might want to leave for self-study in vacations, are marked with a dagger (†).

The reading for each topic is divided into two parts. In writing your tutorial essay, focus on the CORE READING, using as a guide the more introductory texts marked with a star (*) and any Faculty lectures on the topic—the lectures are often available online via Canvas, and are a good indication of what might come up in the exams. You can then look at the FURTHER READING, as well as anything else on the Faculty Reading List, when you get around to exploring topics in more depth during later vacations.

The current version of this reading list was put together in light of my experience using previous incarnations in teaching Early Modern Philosophy to undergraduates in Oxford over the years. I’m grateful to various friends and colleagues for advice and discussion, especially Alexander Douglas, Steph Marston, and Peter Millican. If you’d like to use the list for teaching, please feel free. Feedback and corrections are gratefully received!

Latest update: 14th May 2022

DESCARTES

1. Doubt†
2. The Cogito
3. God
4. Error and the Will
5. The Circle
6. Mind and Body†

SPINOZA

1. Spinoza’s Monism

BERKELEY

1. Abstract Ideas
2. Immaterialism
3. God and Reality
4. Spirits

HUME

1. Hume’s Theory of the Mind
2. Reason and Induction
3. Hume on Causation
4. The External World
5. The Self
6. Scepticism and Naturalism

VACATION READING and SET TEXTS

For this paper, you will need to be able to answer questions on at least one of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz and at least one of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. The set texts are Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), Spinoza’s Ethics (1677), Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), Leibniz’s Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) and Monadology (1714), Berkeley’s Principles of Human Knowledge (1710) and Three Dialogues (1713), and Book One of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1739/40).

Unless otherwise agreed, we will be focusing on Descartes’ Meditations, Berkeley’s Principles and Three Dialogues, and the first book of Hume’s Treatise. Familiarity with these set texts is absolutely essential. You will therefore need to buy your own copy of each, and read it through in its entirety in the vacation beforehand. There are several different editions—and, where applicable, translations—of them out there, and quality varies, so it is important that you get hold of the right ones. I can recommend the following:

In addition to these, you may want to get hold of copies of the following, which contain other important works by Descartes, Berkeley, and Hume, and which will be useful in studying topics in more depth.

In the event that we have agreed to look at the set texts by any of the other authors, you will need to get a copy of those too. Again, there are various editions and translations. I can recommend the following:

ANTHOLOGIES and COLLECTIONS

While most of the readings can be obtained online, it’s useful to have good anthologies and collections of papers on the authors we’re studying, so as to be able to read around a bit more widely. The following are all recommended, containing many of the key readings and much more besides, and are referenced below.

DESCARTES

1. DOUBT

TOP

ESSAY QUESTION

What are the sceptical hypotheses of the First Meditation? What does each hypothesis call into doubt? Why does Descartes have the meditator engage in the project of raising them? Is the project well-motivated?

CORE READING

For this, your first week on Descartes’s Meditations, you should start by reading the whole thing—it’s only 60 pages or so—to get a sense of how the sceptical hypotheses of the First Meditation structure the rest of the text. Then go back and work through the First Meditation more carefully, before tackling the corresponding Selections from the Objections and Replies. (We will talk in tutorials and classes about strategies for getting a preliminary grip on texts like the Meditations.) After all that—but only after that—work through whatever of the following secondary reading you can manage, starting with the selection from Hatfield’s book, which, as explained above, is marked with a star (*) to indicate that it’s more introductory. You needn’t read all three of them just now—though by all means do if you have the time. Come back later to anything that you miss.

FURTHER READING

In pursuing topics for this paper in more depth, you’ll find various other primary texts helpful. For Descartes, these include the two other major philosophical works he published in his lifetime, Discourse on the Method (1637) and Principles of Philosophy (1644), and the Conversations with Burman (1648). For each topic, I will specify the relevant further primary texts as I do here, at the top of the FURTHER READING, following it up with suggestions for further secondary reading. Of the further secondary reading for this week, Blumenfeld and Blumenfeld (1978) and Stroud (1982) may be familiar to you already from first year work for General Philosophy, setting out and defending interpretations of the dreaming argument. Curley (1978) has a similar focus. See also Foucault (2006), discussing the contrast in status in the First Meditation between dreams and madness. Carriero (2009) and Frankfurt (1970) are, like Williams (1978) and Wilson (1978) in the CORE READING, more wide ranging, covering various themes arising out of the First Meditation. Burnyeat (1982) is a classic, and especially important if you are also studying Berkeley for this paper, arguing that Berkeley’s immaterialism only became so much as conceivable after Descartes’s repurposing of the materials of classical scepticism. Williams (1986) is developed partly in response, arguing that Descartes’s radicalisation of classical scepticism, far from emerging naturally out of common sense reflection, as Descartes himself presents it, in fact relies on substantive and controversial foundationalist assumptions. You’ll find interesting critical discussion of Williams in Broughton (2002)—see Ch. 5 in particular. See also Larmore’s papers in Gaukroger and Cunning, Cunning’s own contribution to Cunning, and Owens’ paper in B&C. Though not something he explicitly discusses, Owens’ piece is very helpful for thinking about how Descartes’s views on scepticism and belief or judgement contrast with those of Hume, who you may also be studying this term.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

What role is played by the supposition that the meditator has ‘arrived at [their] present state by fate or chance or a continuous chain of events, or by some other means’? (2021)

Does the philosophy of Descartes succeed in either upholding or refuting the possibility that you are only dreaming that you are sitting this exam? (2020)

Critically compare the views of Hume and at least one other author covered by this paper on the topic of scepticism. (2019)

Was Descartes’ method of doubt properly executed? Are there any matters he should have called into doubt but did not? Are there any matters he did call into doubt but should not have? (2018)

2. THE COGITO

TOP

ESSAY QUESTION

What is the certainty at which the meditator arrives early on in the Second Meditation, and how exactly does she arrive at it? Does she try to extract more from the argument than she is entitled to?

CORE READING

As with last week, focus on getting a preliminary grip on the primary reading, using the strategies and techniques we’ll have discussed in classes and tutorials, before going on to the secondary reading below. As before, don’t worry too much about getting through it all now, but come back later to anything you miss.

FURTHER READING

The Second Meditation raises various issues. First, is the cogito an inference? If not, what is it? Hintikka (1962) raises objections against inferential interpretations and argues for an alternative, performative one. Wilson (1978) in the CORE READING, by contrast, argues for an inferential interpretation. See also: Frankfurt (1966), raising influential criticisms of Hintikka’s interpretation and an objection to the sort of naive inferential interpretation defended by Wilson; Ch. 3 of Kenny (1968), defending a hybrid approach; and Markie (1992), defending what he calls the modified self-evident intuition/immediate inference interpretation. You’ll also find discussion of the issue in some of the books listed in the FURTHER READING for DOUBT. See especially Ch. 4 of Curley (1978), building on Frankfurt’s approach, and Ch. 7 of Broughton (2002), defending an inferential interpretation that interestingly differs from Wilson’s. Second, is the cogito sound? In particular, what, if anything, entitles the meditator to the claim I think rather than there is some thinking going on? Williams (1978), in the CORE READING, contains, among other things, a classic defence of Descartes on this score. See also the rewarding discussion of the issue in Peacocke (2012). Third, in what sense, exactly, does the cogito serve as an Archimedean point in the subsequent Meditations? For discussion of this, see Beyssade (1993) as well as various of the pieces already mentioned. Cunning (2007), examining in what sense, if any, the meditator regards her existence as dubitable, is also relevant here, connecting with issues you can look at in connection with THE CIRCLE. Connecting with issues you can look at in studying CARTESIAN DUALISM, think also about how far Descartes take himself to have got in the Second Meditation towards establishing the claim that thought alone belongs to his essence. See Schiffer (1976), as well as Ch. 4 of Kenny (1968), Ch. 4 of Williams (1978), Wilson (1978) in the CORE READING, Rozemond’s paper in Gaukroger, and Alanen’s in Cunning. Lastly, what exactly is the discussion of the piece of wax towards the end of the Second Meditation supposed to contribute? See Schmitter (2000), as well as the discussion in Wilson (1978) in the CORE READING and in Morris’s paper in Cunning. You’ll find discussion of the Second Meditation in Ch. 2 of Carriero (2009), listed in the FURTHER READING for DOUBT. See also Curley’s contribution to Gaukroger, and Broughton’s and Stroud’s to B&C.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Why does Descartes employ the example of a ball of wax in the Second Meditation? (2021)

How can Descartes know that he exists before he knows what he is? (2020)

What role does the Cogito play in the strategy of the Meditations, and is Descartes’s appeal to it legitimate? (2019)

Does Descartes succeed in demonstrating that thinking belongs to our essence? Has he any good reason for denying that extension does also? (2018)

3. GOD

TOP

ESSAY QUESTION

How, and why, does Descartes argue for the existence of God in the Third Meditation and then again in the Fifth Meditation? What, if anything, is wrong with his arguments?

CORE READING

As with previous weeks, focus on the primary reading before going on to the secondary reading below. As before, don’t worry if you can’t get through it all now, and come back later to anything you miss.

FURTHER READING

Descartes has the meditator offer arguments for the existence of God in both the Third and Fifth Meditations, aiming to answer the third and most extensive of the doubts raised in the First, the deceiving God/defective origins/evil demon doubt, and to thereby vindicate the truth rule extracted out of the meditator’s reflections on the cogito at the start of the Third—a task that has apparently been accomplished at the end of the Fifth. The arguments of variants of two traditional arguments for the existence of God. Those of the Third are variants of traditional cosmological or causal arguments, and turn on theses Descartes holds about ideas. You will want to get to grip with these, especially the causal principle that the cause of an idea has as much formal reality as the idea itself has objective reality. For an introduction and overview of the issues surrounding Descartes’ views about ideas, see the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on the topic, Smith (2000/21). On the causal principle and other aspects of the causal arguments of the Third Meditation, see Delahunty (1980), O’Toole (1993), Schmaltz (2013). The Fifth Meditation offers a version of the so-called ontological argument, offered by St. Anselm and criticised by Aquinas. Descartes’ defence of the argument raises a plethora of philosophical and interpretive issues. For an overview, see the Stanford Encyclopedia entry, Nolan (2001/21), and, for an interesting and influential defence of the argument, connecting with contemporary issues in the metaphysics of modality, see Plantinga (1974). You’ll find discussion of the arguments in both Meditations in Beyssade (1992) and in Mackie (1982), and we’ll be returning to a central issue concerning them both when we look at THE CIRCLE. See also some of the pieces listed in the FURTHER READING for DOUBT: Ch. 8 of Broughton looks at the arguments of the Third Meditation; Ch. 3 (II) and 5 of Carriero (2009) discuss the arguments for the existence of God in the Third and Fifth Meditations respectively; while Ch. 6 of Curley (1978) discusses the arguments in both Meditations (and is pretty taken by the ontological argument). See also Ch. 6 and 7 of Kenny (1968), listed in the FURTHER READING for THE COGITO. Kenny follows up some issues concerning the ontological argument in the Fifth Meditation in his (1969) paper, listed below. You’ll also find good discussion of relevant issues in the papers by Brown, Cottingham, and Nelson in B&C, the papers by Nolan, Schmitter, Schmaltz, and Koistinen in Cunning, and Nolan and Nelson in Gaukroger. You can think about the issues more in connection with various other topics you might be exploring over the term too, especially SPINOZA’S MONISM, Berkeley on GOD and REALITY, HUME on CAUSATION.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

‘When we attend to the immense power of this being [God], we shall be unable to think of its existence as possible without also recognizing that it can exist by its own power; and we shall infer from this that this being does really exist and has existed from eternity, since it is quite evident by the natural light that what can exist by its own power always exists.’ (DESCARTES, First Set of Replies) Discuss. (2021)

Can Descartes be defended in his claim that we possess an idea of God of such a character that we could not have produced it ourselves? (2019)

Critically compare and contrast Spinoza’s and Descartes’ versions of their ontological argument. (2018)

Is Descartes’ argument for God’s existence in the Third Meditation at all plausible? (2017)

4. ERROR and THE WILL

TOP

ESSAY QUESTION

What problems is Descartes attempting to address in the Fourth Meditation? How successful are his solutions to them?

CORE READING

As with previous weeks, focus on the primary reading before going on to the secondary reading below. As before, don’t worry if you can’t get through it all now, and come back later to anything you miss.

FURTHER READING

Having established to her satisfaction that God both exists and is not a deceiver, the meditator notes that this appears to imply that she is not capable of error. Yet she knows by experience that she is, something she had noted back in Meditation One. There are two problems. First, a version of the traditional problem of evil: why does a supremely perfect God allow error to occur? Second, how is such error even possible if God is not a deceiver and the meditator is not defectively designed? Both problems are addressed in Meditation Four—see Ch. 2 of Ragland (2016) for some discussion of the treatment of the first. But it is the second and its threat to the truth rule hypothesized in Meditation Three that is Descartes’ central concern. Descartes’ solution is simply stated: errors are the result, not of any defects in what God has given me, but rather of my misusing those gifts, and more specifically of my using one of the faculties he has given me, the will, to affirm something that another of my faculties, the intellect, has not clearly and distinctly perceived. But the solution raises various interpretative and philosophical questions. Many of these focus on Descartes’ conception of freedom. For example, Descartes seems to hold both that we are somehow compelled to assent to what we clearly and distinctly perceive and that, in so acting, we are at our most free. This appears to commit him to denying the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: one acts freely in φ-ing only if one could have done otherwise. Yet in various places Descartes appears to endorse the Principle. What gives? Kenny (1972) is a classic discussion. See also Chappell (1994), Christofidou (2013), Cunning (2014), Naaman-Zauderer (2010), and Ch. 3 onwards of Ragland (2016). For more on Descartes’ theory of judgement, see Nuchelmans (1983) and Rosenthal (1986). See also Curley (1975), a classic article addressing the question whether Descartes’ theory commits him to the view that we can simply decide to believe something. You’ll also find discussion of Meditation Four in the papers by Lennon and Wee in Cunning, Newman in B&C, Della Rocca in Gaukroger, and Ch. 4 of Carriero (2009), listed in the FURTHER READING for DOUBT.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Is it plausible to trace all human error to the fact that our understanding is finite and our will infinite? (2021)

In what sense does Descartes hold that judgement involves the faculty of choice or freedom of the will? (2019)

Does Descartes have a conception of freedom of the will that can be applied consistently to God and to created thinking substances? (2017)

‘[W]hen I look more closely at myself and inquire into the nature of my errors (for these are the only evidence of some imperfection in me), I notice that they depend on two concurrent causes, namely on the faculty of knowledge which is in me, and on the faculty of choice or freedom of the will; that is, they depend on both the intellect and the will simultaneously.’ (DESCARTES, Fourth Meditation) Discuss. (2016)

5. THE CIRCLE

TOP

ESSAY QUESTION

Does Descartes have a good response to the objection that his attempt to validate clear and distinct perception is circular?

CORE READING

As with previous weeks, focus on the primary reading before going on to the secondary reading below. As before, don’t worry if you can’t get through it all now, and come back later to anything you miss.

FURTHER READING

The problem this week is an apparent circularity in Descartes’s reasoning in the Meditations. He seems to be arguing from clearly and distinctly perceived premises to the intermediary conclusion that God exists and is not a deceiver, and from there to the final conclusion that whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is true. But isn’t this to try to prove the veracity of clear and distinct perception by presupposing that very claim? There are two main approaches, and if you’re thinking about the topic in depth, you’ll want to get clear on the problems and prospects of both. On a bounded doubt interpretation, certain propositions, including the premises of the proof that God exists and is not a deceiver, are immune to the evil demon doubt, and are known with certainty by meditator from the outset. This is the strategy pursued by Della Rocca (2005) and Rickless (2005). See also Ch. 8 of Kenny (1968), Ch. III of Wilson (1978), and Ch. 9 of Broughton (2002) in the CORE and FURTHER READING for DOUBT and THE COGITO. On an unbounded doubt interpretation, the evil demon doubt applies universally, but undermines the propositions that one clearly and distinctly perceives only indirectly, when one is not attending to them. This is the strategy pursued by Newman and Nelson (1999) in the CORE READING and van Cleve (1979), Loeb (1992), and Sosa (1997). See also Ch. 5 of Curley (1978) and §III of Ch. 5 of Carriero (2009) in the FURTHER READING for DOUBT, as well as Carriero’s contribution to B&C. Think also about approaches that deny Descartes was trying to show that clear and distinct perception is veracious in the first place. One such approach, defended in Doney (1955), but subjected to decisive criticism in Frankfurt (1962), has it that he was rather trying to show that memory is reliable. Another, defended by Frankfurt himself in his (1978) piece in the CORE READING and elsewhere, has it that Descartes was trying to show only that clear and distinct perception is self-validating. For some discussion of Frankfurt, see again Ch. 5 of Curley (1978) in the FURTHER READING for DOUBT, as well as Lennon (2008) and Newman’s reply to Frankfurt (1978) in D&L. See also Gewirtz (1941), an important influence on Frankfurt and an early and often-cited classic.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

How far does the Cartesian Circle undermine Descartes’ attempts to prove the existence of God? (2020)

‘When I said that we can know nothing for certain until we are aware that God exists, I expressly declared that I was speaking only of knowledge of those conclusions which can be recalled when we are no longer attending to the arguments by means of which we deduced them.’ (DESCARTES, Second Replies, CSM II: 100) Discuss. (2019)

Does a distinction between ‘knowledge’ (cognitio) and ‘science’ (scientia) help Descartes avoid the objection of the Cartesian circle? (2018)

Is it true that Descartes cannot escape the Cartesian circle if certainty implies truth? (2016)

6. MIND and BODY

TOP

ESSAY QUESTION

How did Descartes argue for the thesis that there is a “real distinction” between mind and body? What, if anything, is wrong with his arguments? What are the main problems with his view? Can they be solved?

CORE READING

As always, you should read the primary reading before the following secondary reading. If you worked on this topic in doing General Philosophy in your first year, you may already be familiar with Ch. VI of Wilson (1978). If so, take a look instead (or as well) at Rozemond’s ‘Descartes’s Dualism’ in B&C, which sets out her alternative to Wilson’s interpretation of Descartes’s main argument for a real distinction between mind and body—one which is developed in more detail in Ch. 1 of her (1998) book, listed below in the FURTHER READING, and probably the most important development in the subsequent literature on the argument.

FURTHER READING

There are two main questions to think about this week. First, how does Descartes argue for a real distinction between mind and body? The standard interpretation of his central argument—set out in Ch. 4 of Williams (1978) and §3 of Wilson (1978) in the CORE READING—involves a puzzling move from the claim ‘I do not clearly and distinctly perceive that I am extended’ to the claim ‘I clearly and distinctly perceive that I am not extended’. An alternative interpretation, developed in Ch. 1 of Rozemond (1998) and summarised in her contribution, ‘Descartes’s Dualism’ in B&C, tries to make do with the weaker claim, and appeal instead to a certain metaphysics of substance, mode, and attribute. See also Dutton (2003), arguing that a central plank of Rozemond’s interpretation lacks textual support. For other discussions of Descartes’s arguments, see Ch. 4 of Kenny (1968), Schiffer (1976), Ch. 7 of Curley (1978), and Ch. 2 and 6 of Carriero (2009), listed as FURTHER READING for either DOUBT or THE COGITO. The second question is whether the view that there is a real distinction between mind and body faces insurmountable objections. Historically, the main worry has been that, in holding that there is a real distinction, Descartes cannot account for the possibility of causal interactions between mind and body. When pressed on this by Elisabeth of Bohemia, Descartes appealed to a “primitive notion” of mind-body union, but many commentators have found this problematic. Besides Wilson (1978) in the CORE READING, see Radner (1971), a pioneering English-language piece on the issue, and Garber (1983). Others argue that Descartes’s position commits him to a form of trialism, the view that there are three radically different kinds of created substance. See Cottingham (1985) and Hoffman (1986), attributing to Descartes a form of Aristotelian hylomorphism, holding that the mind is the substantial form of the human being and body the matter. For critical discussion of these views, see in the first instance Yandell (1997). See also Brown in D&L, replying to Garber, and Ch. 5 of Rozemond (1998) and Kaufman (2008), replying to Hoffman. Hoffman replies in his ‘The Union and Interaction of Mind and Body’ in B&C, defending his interpretation of Descartes as endorsing hylomorphism, and arguing that the interaction problem is no worse for Descartes than it is for others. The topic raises issues concerning the will, discussed in Ch. 10 of Williams (1978) in the CORE READING, and causation, which you can explore further in studying Hume on CAUSATION. See also Schmaltz (2006) and Della Rocca’s paper in B&C.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Is Descartes’ theory of ‘substantial union’ or ‘intermingling’ between the mind and the body compatible with his dualism? (2021)

Can their divisibility or indivisibility tell us anything about the relationship between mind and body? (2020)

What is a ‘real distinction’? What would be required to demonstrate that there obtains a ‘real distinction’ between any two items? Does Descartes succeed in the case of mind and body? (2019)

‘There is a great difference between the mind and the body, inasmuch as the body is by its very nature always divisible, while the mind is utterly indivisible. … This one argument would be enough to show me that the mind is completely different from the body, even if I did not already know as much from other considerations.’ (DESCARTES, Meditation VI) Why does Descartes think this argument is so powerful? Was he correct? (2018)

SPINOZA

1. SPINOZA’S MONISM

TOP

ESSAY QUESTION

How, if at all, does Spinoza’s conception of substance differ from Descartes’s? What is the relation, on his view, between a substance and its attributes and modes? How does he argue for substance monism, and is his argument convincing?

CORE READING

FURTHER READING

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

‘One universe with many interconnected substances. One substance with many interconnected modes. What’s the difference?’ Has Spinoza any good answer to this challenge? (2020)

What is Spinoza’s argument for substance monism, and how convincing is it? (2019)

Critically compare and contrast Spinoza’s and Descartes’ versions of their ontological argument. (2018)

If each is conceptually self-contained, or ‘conceived through itself alone’, what is the difference between substance and attributes? (2017)

BERKELEY

1. ABSTRACT IDEAS

TOP

ESSAY QUESTION

How successful is Berkeley’s attack on Locke’s theory of abstraction? Does it crucially rely on an imagistic conception of ideas?

CORE READING

FURTHER READING

Guide coming soon.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Is Berkeley right to think that abstract ideas are impossible? (2021)

Does Berkeley’s critique of abstract ideas rest on the assumption that ideas are images? (2020)

Berkeley suggests that the doctrine of abstract ideas has ‘had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate and perplexed, and … occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties in almost all parts of knowledge.’ (Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction, §6) Why did Berkeley think it so important to attack abstract ideas, and how far does the rest of his theory depend on their rejection? (2019)

‘Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves. That we have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see…. In order to prepare the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving what follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduction, concerning the nature and abuse of Language. But the unravelling this matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design, by taking notice of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate and perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties in almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the opinion that the mind hath a power of framing abstract ideas or notions of things.’ (BERKELEY, Treatise, Introduction) Why was the attack on abstract ideas so important to Berkeley? (2018)

2. IMMATERIALISM

TOP

ESSAY QUESTION

How does Berkeley argue for immaterialism, i.e. the thesis that “there is not any other substance than spirit, or that which perceives” (Principles, Pt. I, ¶7)? What, if anything, is wrong with his argument(s)?

CORE READING

FURTHER READING

Guide coming soon.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Why does Berkeley hold that sensible qualities are ideas? Is he right? (2021)

‘For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percipi…’ (BERKELEY, Principles §3). Explain and evaluate. (2020)

‘It is one thing to be sceptical about whether or not matter exists, but quite another to declare that it is impossible and cannot exist. Berkeley has no good reason to advance beyond the former position to the latter.’ Discuss. (2019)

‘Sometimes Berkeley complains that matter is unknowable, other times he says it repugnant or contradictory, and yet other times he suggests it is empty or vacuous. But nothing can have all three of these faults.’ Discuss. (2018)

3. GOD and REALITY

TOP

ESSAY QUESTION

How, if at all, does the argument Berkeley offers for the existence of God in the Three Dialogues differ from the argument in the Principles of Human Knowledge? What role does God play in Berkeley’s account of reality? Is this account adequate? Is it consistent with the traditional biblical account of creation? Is it a form of phenomenalism?

CORE READING

FURTHER READING

Guide coming soon.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Assess Berkeley’s response to the objection that it seems ‘absurd to take away natural causes, and the immediate operation of spiritual causes’. (2021)

[JM: Note that this question misquotes Berkeley, and obscures the meaning of the passage, which is from Principles Pt. I, § 51, and actually reads: “it will be demanded whether it does not seem absurd to take away natural causes, and ascribe every thing to the immediate operation of spiritual causes?”]

Can Berkeley give a coherent account of unperceived existence? (2020)

What sense, if any, can Berkeley give to the claim that the examination room continues to exist when you are not perceiving it? (2019)

In what sense for Berkeley does God continue to perceive things when no one else is doing so? Does this suggestion help him? (2018)

4. SPIRITS

TOP

ESSAY QUESTION

Does Berkeley think of spirits as substances and ideas as modes? What is the parity objection, and does Berkeley have a good response to it? Does Berkeley’s account of spirits allow for the possibility of human action?

CORE READING

FURTHER READING

Guide coming soon.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Evaluate Berkeley’s response to the Parity Objection. (2021)

‘[B]esides all that endless variety of Ideas or Objects of Knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers Operations, as Willing, Imagining, Remembering about them. This perceiving, active Being is what I call Mind, Spirit, Soul or my Self.’ (BERKELEY, Principles §2) Discuss. (2020)

Can Berkeley give an adequate account of what it means for two people to see the same thing? (2019)

Can Berkeley account for self-knowledge? (2018)

HUME

1. HUME’S THEORY OF MIND

TOP

ESSAY QUESTION

How, if at all, does Hume’s theory of what he calls perceptions differ from Locke’s theory of ideas? Can Hume draw a distinction ‘betwixt feeling and thinking’? How are we to understand his ‘first principle of human nature’? Why is he so unconcerned by the so-called missing shade of blue?

CORE READING

FURTHER READING

If you are working on this topic in more depth, Stroud (1977), which sparked a renaissance of work on Hume, is a must-read. I’ll be suggesting chapters from it as Further Reading in connection with many of the other topics, too. Other classics for this topic include: Bennett’s contribution to Millican, a revised version of a chapter from his 1971 book, Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes (OUP); Everson (1988), arguing for a functional interpretation of Hume’s notions of force, vivacity, and liveliness; and Pears (1990), a difficult but rewarding discussion, arguing for a middle ground between positivist interpretations, like Bennett’s, and more naturalist interpretations, like Garrett’s and Stroud’s. More recent work includes Kail (2007), Landy (2006), and Schafer (2013). For Locke’s theory of ideas, which serves as important background to Hume’s theory of mind, see Chappell (1994). It’s worth thinking also about various connected topics: Hume’s associationism, treatment of abstract ideas, and theory of belief. (The latter’s particularly important in thinking about Hume’s approach to causation and causal necessity.) For discussion, try Bennett (2001, Ch. 33), Pears (1990, Ch. 4), Stroud (1977, pp. 68-76), and the opening few sections of Broackes’ paper in Millican.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Is Hume too casual about the distinction between impressions and ideas? (2021)

‘Hume uses “force and vivacity” in too many different ways for the notion to be useful in any of them.’ Discuss. (2020)

Explain and assess the arguments that Hume offers to support his principle ‘[t]hat all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent’. (Treatise of Human Nature, 1.1.1.7) (2019)

Is there anything worth retaining in Hume’s notion of ‘force and vivacity’? (2018)

2. REASON and INDUCTION

TOP

ESSAY QUESTION

What is Hume aiming to prove with his famous argument concerning induction, and how does it proceed? In what sense, if any, is he a sceptic about inductive inference?

CORE READING

FURTHER READING

Background on induction: Stroud (1977) is a classic, responding to the deductivist interpretation, of the likes of D. C. Stove. Non-sceptical readings emerged, see e.g. Broughton (1983). Took Hume to be trying to show only that induction isn’t founded on reason in a narrow sense. Criticised by both Garrett and Millican. Garrett’s views initially in his (1997), but developed in response to critics over the next few years; see his ‘Appendix: The Meaning of Hume’s Conclusion concerning “Inductive” Inferences’ in Millican. As Millican explains in his (2012) piece, this moves him close to Owen (1999). See Roth (2006) for an overview of the Garrett-Millican debate, among other things. See also Garrett and Millican (2011), discussing both induction and causation, next week’s topic. Other good recent papers on the topic include: Loeb (2008), Qu (2014).

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

‘Tho’ causation be a philosophical relation…’tis only so far as it is a natural relation, and produces an union among our ideas, that we are able to reason upon it, or draw any inference from it.’ (HUME, A Treatise of Human Nature, 1.3.6) Explain and discuss. (2021)

Is Hume a sceptic about induction? (2020)

What purpose is served by Hume’s analysis of philosophical relations into seven categories and his later division of these seven into ‘two classes’, depending on whether or not they ‘depend entirely on the ideas’ (Treatise 1.3.1.1)? Is his analysis of relations successful? (2019)

Can Hume coherently refer to ‘just and conclusive’ probable inferences? (2017)

3. HUME on CAUSATION

TOP

ESSAY QUESTION

What are the reductionist, sceptical realist, and projectivist interpretations of Hume on causation? Which, if any, is correct?

CORE READING

FURTHER READING

Read and Richman, eds. (2008) is invaluable, containing both classics and essential new pieces on the topic. In addition to Strawson’s piece in the Core Reading, it contains important pieces that: defend the sceptical realist interpretation (Craig, Wright, Kail); criticise the sceptical realist interpretation (Winkler, Millican, Jacobsen); and defend the projectivist interpretation (Stroud, Blackburn—the latter is reprinted with a postscript in Millican). For a prominent defence of the reductionist interpretation, see Garrett (1997) and (2009). Stroud (1977) suggests the projectivist interpretation. Projectivism is also discussed, sympathetically, by Beebee (2006) and, critically, by Kail (2007). Millican (2009) develops his criticism of sceptical realism.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Critically compare and contrast Hume’s views on causation with those of another author on this paper. (2020)

‘We … are never sensible of any connexion betwixt causes and effects, and … ’tis only by our experience of their constant conjunction, we can arrive at any knowledge of this relation. Now as all objects, which are not contrary, are susceptible of a constant conjunction, and as no real objects are contrary; I have inferr’d from these principles [cf. T 1.3.15], that to consider the matter a priori, any thing may produce any thing, and that we shall never discover a reason, why any object may or may not be the cause of any other, however great, or however little the resemblance may be betwixt them. … we find … by experience, that [thought and motion] are constantly united; which being all the circumstances, that enter into the idea of cause and effect, when apply’d to the operations of matter, we may certainly conclude, that motion may (HUME, Treatise 1.4.5.30) Discuss. (2019)

Critically compare and contrast Hume’s theory of causation with that of at least one other author covered by this paper. (2018)

Why does Hume give two definitions of ‘cause’? (2017)

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Reading Lists

• Early Modern Philosophy
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• Ethics
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• Logic and Language
• Mathematics
• Cognitive Science
• Philosophical Logic

Lectures

• Frege and Tarski, HT 2018
• Philosophy of Logic, HT 2017
• General Philosophy, HT 2016