Philosophy of Mind

Below are readings and essay questions for tutorials in Philosophy of Mind. Many of the readings are available online, and all are easily obtained from the college or other libraries in Oxford, but if you are struggling to get hold of anything, email me, as I have PDF copies of nearly everything.

The default plan is to cover the TUTORIAL TOPICS. We start with the mind-body problem, looking at type-identity theories, functionalism, consciousness, and zombies. We then look at some issues in the epistemology of mind, self-knowledge and other minds, before finishing off with a look at core issues in the philosophy of perception and the philosophy of action. The plan is not set in stone, however, and I’ve also listed a range of OTHER TOPICS. If you want to cover some of these instead, let me know, and I’ll see what we can do. Note that topics you may have covered in studying General Philosophy or Knowledge and Reality, and so might want to leave for self-study later, are marked with a dagger (†).

The reading for each topic is divided into two parts. In writing your tutorial essay, focus on the CORE READING, using as a guide the more introductory texts marked with a star (*) and any Faculty lectures on the topic—the lectures may be available online via Canvas, and are a good indication of what might come up in the exams. You can then look at the FURTHER READING as well as anything else on the Faculty Reading List (email me for this) when exploring topics in more depth during later vacations.

The current version of this reading list was put together in light of my experience using previous incarnations in teaching Philosophy of Mind to undergraduates in Oxford over the years. If you’d like to use the list for teaching, please feel free. Feedback and corrections are gratefully received!

Latest update: 6th July 2022

TUTORIAL TOPICS

1. Type-Identity
2. Functionalism
3. Consciousness
4. Modal Arguments
5. Introspection
6. Other Minds†
7. Perception†
8. Action Explanation

OTHER TOPICS

• Behaviourism
• Anomalous Monism
• Mental Causation†
• Physicalism and Supervenience
• Folk Psychology
• Intentionality
• Consciousness and Content
• Externalism about Mental Content
• Self-Deception
• Bodily Sensations
• Emotion
• Imagination
• Memory
• Action and Agency

VACATION READING and TEXTBOOKS

If you are thinking about whether to take Philosophy of Mind, or have decided to do so and want to do some preliminary reading over the vacation beforehand, take a look at any of the following textbooks:

These can be profitably read both as preparation beforehand and as guides and consolidation during and after your tutorial work, but they are no substitute for any of the CORE READING and FURTHER READING suggested below. To do well in any philosophy paper, you have to work through the details.

ANTHOLOGIES and COLLECTIONS

While most of the readings can be obtained online, it’s often useful to have good anthologies and collections of papers in the philosophy of mind, so as to be able to read around a bit more widely. The following are recommended, containing many of the suggested readings, and are referenced below:

TUTORIAL TOPICS

1. TYPE-IDENTITY

TOP

ESSAY QUESTION

What is the type-identity theory, and what is the best argument for it? What is the multiple realizability argument against the theory? Is it decisive? Are any other arguments against the theory decisive?

CORE READING

Start with any of the introductory readings marked with a star (*)—you needn’t read them all now, but come back later in revision to anything you have missed. Then move on to the unstarred readings, which are more advanced. Smart (1959) is a classic, offering an argument from parsimony for the theory, and defending it from various objections. Lewis (1966) offers another, especially influential argument for the theory. Putnam (1967) raises the multiple realizability objection against the theory.

FURTHER READING

For a causal argument for the type-identity theory, related to issues about MENTAL CAUSATION, see Papineau (2002). You will think more about Lewis’s views in doing FUNCTIONALISM. After doing so, come back and take a look at Lewis (1980), his response to the multiple realizability objection, and Lewis (1995), discussing multiple realizability but also providing a useful summary of his views in the philosophy of mind more generally. For other responses to the multiple realizability objection, see Kim (1992) and Bechtel and Mundale (1999). For a defence of the objection, written by one of its original proponents, see Fodor (1997). Polger and Shapiro (2016) is a recent book, and Bickle (1998/2013) a useful survey. For more on Max Black’s objection to the type-identity theory—discussed by Smart in his paper, and related to issues you can explore in thinking about CONSCIOUSNESS—try Block (2006). For Kripke’s modal objection to the type- (and token-) identity theories, see MODAL ARGUMENTS.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

We can conceive of creatures who are very different from us in physical constitution but share the belief that Ariana Grande is the greatest living pop star. Does this show that type-identity theory is false? (2021)

Does J. J. C. Smart’s topic neutral approach save type-identity theory from the problem of irreducible phenomenal properties? (2020)

If human pain is identifiable with one type of physical state, octopus pain is identifiable with another type of physical state, Martian pain is identifiable with yet another type of physical state (and so on and so forth), would that mean that the type-identity theory is true? (2019)

EITHER
(a) ‘The appeal of functionalism was supposed to be that it could account for the multiple realizability of the mental. But it cannot do so whilst setting a plausible boundary to mentality.’ Discuss.
OR
(b) ‘We could be made of Swiss cheese, and it wouldn’t matter.’ (HILARY PUTNAM) Discuss this comment in relation to the multiple realizability of the mental. (2018)

2. FUNCTIONALISM

TOP

ESSAY QUESTION

“[N]o version of functionalism can avoid both liberalism and chauvinism” (BLOCK). Is that true?

CORE READING

Start with any of the introductory readings marked with a star (*)—you needn’t read them all now, but come back later in revision to anything you have missed. Then move on to the unstarred readings, which are more advanced. Then move on to the unstarred readings, which are more advanced. Lewis (1972), extending his (1966) paper from last week, sets out the main ideas behind the functionalist approach. Block (1978) presents objections to it, which Shoemaker (1975) attempts to address.

FURTHER READING

Putnam was an early proponent of functionalism. In addition to his (1967) paper from last week, see his (1975), distancing himself from the machine functionalism of the earlier paper, but defending the idea that functional isomorphism is key to “unravelling the mysteries in the philosophy of mind”. For more on how to formulate functionalism, see Shoemaker (1981) and Block (1996). For more on absent qualia, see Schwitzgebel (2015), arguing that Block’s example of an artificial body controlled by the population of China, communicating in a way that functionally duplicates the neurons of a brain, would have mental states with qualia, and Lewis (1980), listed as FURTHER READING for last week’s topic, TYPE-IDENTITY. For more on inverted qualia, see Nida-Rümelin (1996) and Byrne (2004/20). For the worry that functionalism cannot accommodate the rationalizing role of mental states, see McDowell (1985) and Heal (1986). For an argument from self-consciousness against functionalism, see Bealer (1997).

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Can two organisms be exactly alike in their functional states while differing in phenomenal state? (2021)

Does the possibility of spectrum inversion pose an insurmountable problem for functionalism? (2020)

EITHER
(a) Can two organisms be exactly alike with respect to their functional states but different with respect to some of their phenomenal states?
OR
(b) If it could be the case that I have an exact physical duplicate who lacks phenomenal consciousness, does it follow that I lack phenomenal consciousness too? (2019)

EITHER
(a) ‘The appeal of functionalism was supposed to be that it could account for the multiple realizability of the mental. But it cannot do so whilst setting a plausible boundary to mentality.’ Discuss.
OR
(b) ‘We could be made of Swiss cheese, and it wouldn’t matter.’ (HILARY PUTNAM) Discuss this comment in relation to the multiple realizability of the mental. (2018)

3. CONCIOUSNESS

TOP

ESSAY QUESTION

‘The fact that conscious experiences and sensations have phenomenal properties precludes the possibility of understanding consciousness in physicalist terms. So physicalism is false.’ Discuss.

CORE READING

Start with any of the introductory readings marked with a star (*)—you needn’t read them all now, but come back later in revision to anything you have missed. Then move on to the unstarred readings, which are more advanced. Nagel (1974) is one of the most cited papers in the philosophy of mind, arguing that consciousness cannot be explained in physical terms. Jackson (1982) and (1986) present his influential knowledge argument against physicalism (and for qualia). Dennett (1988) argues that conscious experiences do not have qualia, at least as the latter are ordinarily understood.

FURTHER READING

Various arguments against physicalism rest on the idea that conscious experiences and sensations have phenomenal properties. This week our focus is on two, broadly epistemological arguments, the explanatory gap and knowledge arguments; we turn next week to look at the more metaphysical MODAL ARGUMENTS of Kripke and Chalmers. In working more on the knowledge argument, LNS is a very useful resource, collecting together a range of key works, including Lewis (1988), defending the ability hypothesis. See also Tye (2000), criticising Lewis’s strategy, and defending the alternative phenomenal concepts approach. This is criticised in turn by Chalmers in a paper specially written for LNS, ‘Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument’. See also Nida-Rümelin and O Conaill (2002/19), a comprehensive overview of the debate over the knowledge argument. Key papers on the explanatory gap include McGinn (1989) and Chalmers (1995). For a relatively short piece criticising both arguments, as well as last week’s absent qualia argument, see Van Gulick (1993). See also Shoemaker (1991), attempting to reject Dennett-style eliminativism about qualia whilst defending functionalism and materialism. For an important attempt to demystify consciousness, the influential higher-order thought (HOT) approach, see Rosenthal (1986). For critical discussion of the HOT approach, see Block (2011).

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

An argument against physicalism is that it leaves out the qualitative side of our mental life. Consider one such argument from the literature, and say whether you think that argument should be given a metaphysical reading or an epistemological reading. (2020)

EITHER
(a) ‘To find a place for consciousness within the natural order, we must either revise our conception of consciousness, or revise our conception of nature.’ (DAVID CHALMERS) Discuss.
OR
(b) In what sense, if any, are zombies conceivable? What does this tell us about the mind-body problem? (2018)

EITHER
(a) Will neuroscientists one day tell us what consciousness really is?
OR
(b) ‘When someone tastes a pineapple for the first time, they find out a fact about reality that they were previously ignorant of.’ Is this true? If so, what are the implications for physicalism? (2015)

EITHER
(a) ‘Having an experience is surely one good way, and surely the only practical way, of coming to know what that experience is like. Can we say, flatly, that it is the only possible way? Probably not.’ (LEWIS) Discuss.
OR
(b) If there is information about a certain type of experience that is not physical information, does that show that there are certain types of non-physical phenomenal properties? (2014)

4. MODAL ARGUMENTS

TOP

ESSAY QUESTION

Are philosophical zombies—physical duplicates of us but who lack conscious experience altogether—conceivable? If so, what, if anything, does this tell us about the relationship between mind and body?

CORE READING

Start with any of the introductory readings marked with a star (*)—you needn’t read them all now, but come back later in revision to anything you have missed. Then move on to the unstarred readings, which are more advanced. Kripke (1980), building on material in the philosophy of language in the earlier lectures, presents an argument against type- and token-identity theories. Chalmers (1996) presents a variation of the argument, targeting materialism more generally. Hill (1997) argues against a key plank of both arguments, namely an assumption connecting conceivability with possibility.

FURTHER READING

Levine (1983) is an important discussion of Kripke’s argument, arguing that it at least demonstrates an explanatory gap. Bealer (1994) defends a version of the argument, arguing that it favourably compares with the multiple realizability argument, the argument from doubt, and the knowledge argument, and that, suitably adapted, goes through. Shoemaker (2011) is a relatively recent discussion of the argument. For more on whether zombies are conceivable, see Kirk (2008). For more on the inference from their conceivability to their possibility, see various of the papers in Gendler and Hawthorne, eds. (2002) and Byrne (2007), arguing that it doesn’t play a role in Kripke’s argument. One important response here, relevant also to last week’s topic, appeals to the phenomenal concepts strategy. Tye took this approach in his (2000) book, listed as FURTHER READING last week, but later abandoned it. See his (2009). See the various papers in Alter and Walter, eds. (2006), a collection focusing on the strategy, and Balog (2012), a recent defence of it. Chalmers responds to objections and develops his views in various papers in his (2010) collection. See especially Parts III and IV. For the suggestion that modal arguments tell in favour of pan-psychism, the view that matter is conscious, see Mørch (2017).

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

‘Panpsychism either commits us to the implausible doctrine that dust particles are conscious, or it faces the problem of explaining how consciousness emerges out of something non-conscious. So, panpsychism is either wildly implausible or ill- motivated.’ Discuss. (2021)

An argument against physicalism is that it leaves out the qualitative side of our mental life. Consider one such argument from the literature, and say whether you think that argument should be given a metaphysical reading or an epistemological reading. (2020)

EITHER
(a) Can two organisms be exactly alike with respect to their functional states but different with respect to some of their phenomenal states? OR
(b) If it could be the case that I have an exact physical duplicate who lacks phenomenal consciousness, does it follow that I lack phenomenal consciousness too? (2019)

EITHER
(a) ‘To find a place for consciousness within the natural order, we must either revise our conception of consciousness, or revise our conception of nature.’ (DAVID CHALMERS) Discuss.
OR
(b) In what sense, if any, are zombies conceivable? What does this tell us about the mind-body problem? (2018)

5. INTROSPECTION

TOP

ESSAY QUESTION

Is introspection a special form of observation, or “inner sense”? If not, what, if anything, is it?

CORE READING

Start with any of the introductory readings marked with a star (*)—you needn’t read them all now, but come back later in revision to anything you have missed. Then move on to the unstarred readings, which are more advanced. Shoemaker (1994) is an extended critique of perceptual models of introspection. Lycan (1996) defends a perceptual model. Byrne (2005) defends a transparency account.

FURTHER READING

The classic contemporary discussion of the inner-sense approach is Armstrong (1993), though it goes back to Locke. Kind (2003) responds to Shoemaker (1994) in its defence. For the acquaintance approach, which goes back to Russell and, before him, Descartes, see Gertler’s contribution to Smithies and Stoljar, eds. (2012). Byrne’s transparency-based approach builds on themes in Evans (1982). For critical discussion, see Boyle (2011). See also the contrasting agentialist approaches of McGeer (1996) and Moran (2001). Moran’s approach is particularly influential, and critically discussed in O’Brien (2003). See also the papers by Byrne and Moran in Smithies and Stoljar, eds. (2012). For Shoemaker’s positive view, constitutivism, see Lecture III of his (1994) and the papers in Part III of Smithies and Stoljar, eds. (2012). For a recent defence of something like expressivism, see Campbell (2020). For a textbook on the issues, expanding on her SEP entry on the topic, see Gertler (2011). Other issues to think about include the sense, if any, in which the knowledge one gains by introspection is epistemologically special—for this, see the entry on SELF-KNOWLEDGE for KNOWLEDGE & REALITY—and the question of how, if at all, such knowledge can be reconciled with EXTERNALISM about MENTAL CONTENT.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Are there convincing grounds to deny that introspection is a form of perception? (2021)

In what ways, if any, does the knowledge of your own mind depend on your knowledge of the external world? (2019)

‘Self-knowledge is simply the limit case of knowing lots about someone who you spend a lot of time with.’ Discuss. (2018)

EITHER
(a) Which of analogy, induction or perception best helps us when it comes to knowing the mind of another?
OR
(b) ‘The problem isn’t: “how do I know my own mind?”, rather, it’s: “how do I know the mind of another?”.’ Discuss. (2017)

6. OTHER MINDS^†

TOP

 ESSAY QUESTION

What is the epistemological or traditional problem of other minds? What is the conceptual problem? Which, if either, is the more fundamental problem? And how, if at all, are they to be solved?

CORE READING

Start with any of the introductory readings marked with a star (*)—you needn’t read them all now, but come back later in revision to anything you have missed. Then move on to the unstarred readings, which are more advanced. Strawson (1958) is a classic discussion of—and sketch of a solution to—the conceptual problem. Pargetter (1984) is a short piece, defending an inference to the best explanation approach to the epistemological problem—an approach criticised in Melnyk (1994), another short piece (together they come to seventeen pages). Cassam (2007) defends the perceptual approach.

FURTHER READING

This week’s topic relates to earlier topics, especially INTROSPECTION. For more on the conceptual problem, see McGinn (1984) and Nagel (1986). For discussion, sympathetic to Strawson, see also Avramides (2001). Discussion of the conceptual problem is often influenced by Wittgenstein. See especially §§253-352 of Part I and §iv of Part II of his Philosophical Investigations. See also Kripke (1982). Contemporary discussions of other minds tends to focus more on the traditional epistemological problem. Ayer (1953) is a classic statement of the issues. See also Putnam (1975) and Sober (2000). For recent discussion of the perceptual approach, see McNeill (2012) and Parrott (2017).

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Can you perceive others’ emotions? (2021)

What are some of the problems with the inferential approach to knowledge of another’s mind? What other approach might one take? (2020)

‘There are interesting questions about how we know things. But there are no interesting questions about how we know about others’ minds as opposed to, say, how we know about pineapples.’ Is this true? (2018)

EITHER
(a) Which of analogy, induction or perception best helps us when it comes to knowing the mind of another?
OR
(b) ‘The problem isn’t: “how do I know my own mind?”, rather, it’s: “how do I know the mind of another?”.’ Discuss. (2017)

7. PERCEPTION^†

TOP

ESSAY QUESTION

What, if anything, does the possibility of hallucination tell us about the nature of perception?

CORE READING

Start with any of the introductory readings marked with a star (*)—you needn’t read them all now, but come back later in revision to anything you have missed. Then move on to the unstarred readings, which are more advanced. Ayer (1951) is a classic presentation of an argument from hallucination for sense data. Austin (1962) is an influential critical discussion of Ayer’s argument. Robinson (1994) offers a revised version of the argument from hallucination—one that attempts to avoid Austin’s criticisms.

If you are already familiar from General Philosophy or Knowledge & Reality with the pieces by Ayer, Austin, and Robinson, try the following advanced readings instead. Anscombe (1962) is a pioneering defence of an intentional theory of perception. Martin (2004) influentially defends disjunctivism. If you are already familiar with these too, you can start exploring some of the FURTHER READING below.

FURTHER READING

For more on intentionalism, see Pautz’s paper in Nanay, ed. (2010). For critical discussion of intentionalism, see Martin (2002) and Travis (2004). For responses to these, see Dorsch (2010) and Siegel’s contribution to Nanay, ed. (2010). For more on disjunctivism, see in the first instance Byrne and Logue, which contains a wealth of important papers, including pioneering work by J. M. Hinton. For critical discussion of disjunctivism, see Burge (2005) and Nudds (2009). For discussion and replies to these criticisms, see in the first instance the later parts of Soteriou (2016). For an overview of work on the content of perception, see Siegel (2015). One issue here, which you can explore in more depth in thinking about CONSCIOUSNESS and CONTENT, is the extent to which the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is determined by intrinsic, non-intentional qualities of the experience, or qualia. Papineau (2014) defends an extreme view, opposed to both intentionalism and disjunctivism, on which the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is wholly determined by such qualia. For some introductory discussion of Papineau’s view, and much more besides, take a look at Pautz (2021).

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

‘Any adequate account of the content of perception takes that content to concern the actual object of perception. So, no matching hallucination could have the same content. Therefore, no adequate intentional theory of perceptual experience has a better response to the causal challenge than naïve realism.’ Discuss. (2021)

EITHER
(a) Can we resolve the problem of perception by claiming that visual experience is representational?
OR
(b) Is perceptual experience constituted by a relation between the subject and the object of experience? (2020)

If two visual experiences are indistinguishable from a subject’s perspective, must these experiences have an underlying mental state in common? (2019)

Can one explain the nature of perceptual experience without appeal to metaphysically extravagant entities? (2018)

8. ACTION EXPLANATION

TOP

ESSAY QUESTION

Are rationalising explanations of intentional action causal explanations? If not, how are the reasons for which an agent does something to be distinguished from other reasons she may have had to do it?

CORE READING

Start with any of the introductory readings marked with a star (*)—you needn’t read them all now, but come back later in revision to anything you have missed. Then move on to the unstarred readings, which are more advanced. Davidson (1963) is a classic, defending the thesis that rationalising explanations are causal explanations. Wilson (1985) criticises Davidson’s thesis, defending an alternative, teleological approach to rationalising explanations. Dancy (2000) criticises Davidson’s thesis, building on an argument developed earlier in the book against psychologism about reasons.

FURTHER READING

This week’s topic has connections to a number of others, especially ANOMALOUS MONISM and MENTAL CAUSATION. For defence of Davidson’s causalism, responding to both teleologists, like Wilson, and Dancy, see Mele (2003). See also Setiya (2011), offering an alternative line of argument for causalism. For naive action theory, see Thompson (2008) and Marcus (2012), the latter criticising both Davidson and his anti-causalist opponents. See also Hyman (2015), also critical of Davidson and anti-causalism alike, Löhrer and Sehon (2016), a recent defence of the teleological approach, and various of the papers in D’Oro and Sandis, eds. (2013)—particularly D’Oro and Sandis’s ‘From Anti-causalism to Causalism and Back: A History of the Reasons/Causes Debate’ and McLaughlin’s criticism of causalism, ‘Why Rationalization Is Not a Species of Causal Explanation’. As a classic of modern philosophy of action, Davidson’s (1963) paper is rivalled perhaps only by Anscombe (1957), who argues, among other things, that intentional actions are those “to which a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ is given application; the sense is of course that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting”. Her discussion of this is quite hard going, but well worth the effort. Schwenkler (2019) is a useful guide. Note that Anscombe’s question, of what it is for an action to be intentional, is not the same as the question of how rationalising explanations of action relate to causal explanations. In her (1957), she remains neutral on the latter question, though she later argued against causalism. Davidson’s views on the former is informed by his views on the latter. Roughly put, he holds that intentional actions are those that are caused in the right way by the agent’s pro-reasons. The key papers are reprinted in the Intention and Action section of his (2001)—see especially ‘Agency’ and ‘How is Weakness of the Will Possible?’. For more on the general topic of what it is for an action to be intentional, see ACTION and AGENCY.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

‘To give the reason for an action is not to cite a cause of the action. So, rational explanation is not causal explanation.’ Critically evaluate this argument. (2021)

Discuss the causal principle in connection with the explanation of action. (2020)

Is giving reasons for an action the same thing as causally explaining it? (2019)

‘When we explain why someone acted a certain way, we make sense of their action.’ Does it follow that the explanation of action is not a form of causal explanation? (2018)

OTHER TOPICS

BEHAVIOURISM

TOP

Coming soon.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

‘A gifted actor can behave exactly as someone who is in excruciating pain acts without themselves being in pain. Therefore, behaviourism is false.’ Discuss. (2021)

EITHER
(a) Does the possibility of super-Spartans fatally undermine analytic behaviourism?
OR
(b) ‘Analytic behaviourism fails because subjects are only disposed to express their beliefs if they desire to do so.’ Discuss. (2020)

‘The Weather Watchers are a race of sentient, intelligent creatures. They are distributed about the surface of their planet, rooted to the ground, profoundly interested in the local weather. They have sensations, thoughts, emotions, beliefs, desires. But they are constitutionally incapable of any sort of behaviour. They lack the necessary physiology. They are not even disposed to behave in any way.’ (GALEN STRAWSON) Strawson argues that such creatures are possible. Is he right? (2019)

Suppose that pain experiences are not always followed by typical pain behaviour. Would this be a problem for behaviourism? (2018)

ANOMALOUS MONISM

TOP

Coming soon.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

What does it mean to say that there are no psycho-physical laws? Why might one think there are no such laws? (2019)

EITHER
(a) ‘We have no right to conclude that there are no psychophysical laws, only that we’ve not yet found any.’ Discuss.
OR
(b) Does Davidson’s anomalous monism imply type-epiphenomenalism? (2018)

Can there be (scientific) laws governing mental events? (2017)

Can anomalous monism do justice to the causal relevance of mental properties? (2016)

MENTAL CAUSATION

TOP

Coming soon.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

‘If it isn’t literally true that my wanting is causally responsible for my reaching, and my itching is causally responsible for my scratching, and my believing is causally responsible for my saying . . . if none of that is literally true, then practically everything I believe about anything is false and it’s the end of the world.’ (JERRY FODOR) Discuss. (2018)

EITHER
(a) Are the mental properties of mental events epiphenomenal? Could epiphenomenal mental properties figure in causal explanations of transitions between mental events?
OR
(b) Can externalism about mental content provide a plausible account of mental causation? (2017)

EITHER
(a) How can externalist views of mental content account for the apparent causal efficacy of the mind?
OR
(b) Can we accept the completeness of physics without being committed to epiphenomenalism about the mental? (2012)

EITHER
(a) Does the distinction between determinate and determinable properties give us any purchase on the problem of mental causation?
OR
(b) Does Davidson’s anomalous monism provide a satisfactory response to Kim’s causal exclusion argument? (2011)

PHYSICALISM and SUPERVENIENCE

TOP

Coming soon.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Is the best formulation of physicalism that worlds which are alike in physical facts are alike in mental facts? (2021)

An argument against physicalism is that it leaves out the qualitative side of our mental life. Consider one such argument from the literature, and say whether you think that argument should be given a metaphysical reading or an epistemological reading. (2020)

‘The mere claim of mind-body supervenience leaves unaddressed the question what grounds or accounts for it.’ (JAEGWON KIM) If this is true, what should physicalists do? (2019)

Should physicalism be understood as the thesis that possible worlds that are physically alike are also mentally alike? (2018)

FOLK PSYCHOLOGY

TOP

Coming soon.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Is there anything wrong with folk psychology? (2019)

Is the belief that eliminativism about propositional attitudes is true self-defeating? (2018)

Is folk psychology just propositional attitude psychology? (2017)

‘The claim that human beings have beliefs, desires, and intentions is a useful fiction. But it isn’t literally true.’ Discuss. (2016)

INTENTIONALITY

TOP

Coming soon.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

‘ […] (a) X’s thinking of Y constitutes a relation between X and Y when Y exists, but (b) not when Y doesn’t; but (c) X’s thinking of Y is the same sort of thing whether Y exists or not. Something plainly has to be given up here; what will it be?’ (A. N. PRIOR) Discuss. (2021)

Franz Brentano claimed that all and only mental states are intentional. Discuss this claim in connection with the emotion of anger. (2020)

‘Any plausible theory of intentionality should account for the possibility that groups of individuals can have intentional states over and above the intentional states of individual members of such groups.’ Do you agree? (2019)

Are there any interesting differences between propositional attitudes and experiences? (2018)

CONSCIOUSNESS and CONTENT

TOP

Coming soon.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

What is the relationship between consciousness and intentionality? (2021)

Are there any interesting differences between propositional attitudes and experiences? (2018)

Does the phenomenal character of visual experiences supervene on their representational contents? (2017)

EXTERNALISM about MENTAL CONTENT

TOP

Coming soon.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

‘Someone who thinks about water thinks about H₂O; someone who thinks about twater thinks about XYZ. So, the psychological facts about a thinker do not supervene on their internal physical states.’ Discuss. (2021)

‘We take ourselves to be open to correction by other members of our linguistic community. This undermines the view that our thought contents depend solely on facts inside the boundary of the skin.’ Discuss. (2020)

EITHER
(a) Can one resist externalism about mental content despite the Twin Earth thought experiments?
OR
(b) Can externalism about mental content account for beliefs about non-existent entities? (2019)

EITHER
(a) What role should causation play in an account of mental content?
OR
(b) Can your counterpart on Twin Earth think about water? (2018)

SELF-DECEPTION

TOP

Coming soon.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Does the possibility of self-deception show that the mind is divided into parts? (2021)

What is philosophically problematic about self-deception? (2020)

To what extent can problems in conceptualising self-deception be answered by reflection on different kinds of consciousness? (2019)

‘The phenomenon of self-deception seems paradoxical only if we assume that people are perfectly rational and perfectly self-aware. But that assumption is obviously false. So there is really no difficulty in making sense of self-deception.’ Discuss. (2016)

BODILY SENSATIONS

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Coming soon.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Is pain a form of bodily perception? (2021)

If phantom pains are possible, does it follow that pains do not have locations? (2019)

Is pain just the sensory discrimination of bodily damage? (2017)

EITHER
(a) Is the intuition that there is an element of contingency in the relation between pain and C-fibre stimulation any more reliable as a guide to what is really possible than the intuition that there is an element of contingency in the relation between heat and molecular motion?
OR
(b) What accounts for the subjectivity of pain? (2016)

Is feeling nauseous a form of perception? (2015)

EMOTION

TOP

Coming soon.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Can you perceive others’ emotions? (2021)

Franz Brentano claimed that all and only mental states are intentional. Discuss this claim in connection with the emotion of anger. (2020)

‘Emotions are intentional states, but are not propositional attitudes; therefore, there are intentional states which are not propositional attitudes.’ Should we accept this argument? (2019)

‘To experience an emotion is just to experience certain bodily changes.’ What might be said against this claim? (2018)

IMAGINATION

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Coming soon.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

‘To imagine being Napoleon is not to imagine oneself being Napoleon.’ Is this true? If so, what does it tell us about the nature of imagination? (2021)

How does imagination differ from perception? (2019)

What is the role of mental images in imagination? (2016)

EITHER
(a) Why might anyone deny that dreams are experiences?
OR
(b) In what sense if any is imagination essentially subject to the will? (2015)

MEMORY

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Coming soon.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

‘Memory is just preserved knowledge.’ Is it? (2021)

Should memory be understood in terms of preserved knowledge? (2018)

Is all memory fundamentally a matter of retaining factual knowledge? (2017)

What is the difference between remembering an event and perceiving an event? (2016)

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Reading Lists

• Early Modern Philosophy
• Knowledge and Reality
• Ethics
• Mind
• Logic and Language
• Mathematics
• Cognitive Science
• Philosophical Logic

Lectures

• Frege and Tarski, HT 2018
• Philosophy of Logic, HT 2017
• General Philosophy, HT 2016